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Little Hilary: Happy at Last? New
Zealand's Family Court and the Matter
of Hilary Foretich'
A Kikuyu proverb tells us: "When elephants fight it is the
grass that suffers." Here, the grass is a little girl. . .She is the
principal figure in a drama of appalling proportions, no matter
what the outcome.2
Hilary Foretich was eight years old in 1990.3 Since before she
was born, she was a bone for her parents to quarrel over, most of the
time in legal proceedings, frequently -in the public press.4
Because various adults deemed it to be in her best interests, Hil-
ary has been examined in detail by an assortment of physicians and
psychologists," visited with her father irregularly and under awkward
conditions,' and was totally separated from both parents for two and
a half years while being transported around the world under an
alias.7
In February, 1990, Hilary was discovered in a new jurisdiction,
New Zealand, which also claimed to act in her best interests. 8 New
Zealand's definition of what constitutes a child's best interests in-
cludes declaring all Family Court proceedings confidential and mak-
ing it illegal to report them.9 The court moved to maintain Hilary's
status quo by awarding her grandparents, William and Antonia
Morgan, temporary custody and ordering them not to leave the
court's jurisdiction and moved to protect her legal interests by ap-
pointing a lawyer to act for her."0 In addition,'the court moved to
I. This Note was originally written in June, 1990, after Hilary Foretich was discovered
in New Zealand but before the Family Court adjudicated her case.
2. Morgan v. Foretich, 546 A.2d 407, 413 (D.C. App. 1988).
3. Id. at 408. •
4. Elson, A Hard-Case of Contempt, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 66 [hereinafter Elson].
Efforts Grow to Shield Girl in Custody Battle, New York Times, Feb. 27, 1990, at A 19, col.
I. Hilary was born a week after her parent's hastily arranged, five months long marriage broke
up.
5. A Mother's Tale: Why I'm Taking no Chances with the Courts, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, June 13, 1988, at 30 [hereinafter A Mother's Tale].
6. Morgan v. Foretich, 546 A.2d 407, 409 (D.C. App. 1988).
7. Cropp, A Life of Strangers and Seedy Motels, New York Times, Feb. 26, 1990, at
A12, col. 3.
8. Berringer, Child's 15,000-Mile Odyssey In a Troubling Custody Case, New York
Times, Feb. 25, 1990, at 22, col. 5.
9. Elson, supra note 4, at 19.
10. As Far Away as You Can Get, TIME, March 5, 1990, at 20; Elson, supra note 4, at
19.
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protect Hilary's privacy interests by issuing an injunction forbidding
the showing of a television documentary about her case. 1
Because the New Zealand Family Court appears to have been
the first legal authority to be truly concerned for Hilary Foretich's
welfare and best interests, this Note contends that New Zealand
should not be obliged to return Hilary to the jurisdiction of United
States courts. This Note also contends that the ultimate disposition
of custody and visitation rights should be the prerogative of the New
Zealand court and that prior or pending United States orders should
not necessarily be considered binding on that court.
The States signatory to the present Convention, [f]irmly
convinced that the interests of children are of paramount im-
portance in matters relating to their custody. . .[h]ave resolved
to conclude a Convention to this effect .... 11
The protection of children and the regulation of matters relating
to their custody have been of increasing interest to the international
legal community. In 1961, the Ninth Session of the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law developed a convention intended
"to establish common provisions on the powers of authorities and the
law applicable in respect of the protection of [children]."'" A re-
placement for a convention signed in 1902," the 1961 document
considers which judicial or administrative authority shall have the
right to exercise power over a child's person or property. 15
By 1980, "the increasing number of cases where children have
been improperly removed across an international frontier," caused
parental custody and visitation rights and the welfare of children to
become matters of major concern to the international community.'"
The Council of Europe developed a convention concerning child cus-
tody in the spring of 1980.17 The Fourteenth Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law followed suit in the fall of
the same year with a convention on international child abduction.'"
Both Conventions call for reciprocal recognition of a state's cus-
tody and visitation orders and for the cooperation of signatory states
1I. Parents See Girl in Custody Fight, New York Times, March 19, 1990, at A]6, col.
6 [hereinafter Parents See Girl].
12. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
13. Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Re-
spect of the Protection of Infants, opened for signature Oct. 5, 1961, 658 U.N.T.S. 145.
14. Id. art. 18, at 153.
15. Id. arts. 1-11, at 145-59.
16. European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning
Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children, opened for signature May,
1980, 19 I.L.M. 273 [hereinafter European Convention].
17. Id.
18. Hague Convention, supra note 12.
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in enforcing those orders within their own boundaries, including re-
turning an abducted child to its custodial parent. 19 The Hague Con-
vention stresses a preference for the voluntary return of an abducted
child,2" and where a return must be ordered, the welfare of the child
is an aspect of major concern. Guidelines include consideration of
the length of time a child has been removed from its custodial par-
ent, the child's preferences, and the situation awaiting the child's
return.2
Both Conventions make provision for enforcing rights of access
(visitation). The European Convention provides for enforcement of
access orders on the same grounds as those for custody orders but
allows the State to modify or refuse an access order.22 The Hague
Convention stresses the removal of obstacles to the exercise of access
rights but makes little provision for either modification or refusal.23
Many nations are not party to either of these Conventions.24 Al-
though the United States has ratified the Hague Convention,2 5 there
is no treaty obligation to recognize a non-signatory's custody or-
ders. 26 However, a portion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act (UCCJA) provides for recognition and enforcement of for-
eign custody orders. 27 This, together with the current international
trend toward mutual recognition of custody orders, is a persuasive
argument for reciprocity in those cases where the other concerned
country is not a signatory to either the Hague Convention or the
European Convention or has not enacted internal laws regarding rec-
ognition of foreign orders.
The Hilary Foretich case has involved two countries, one of
which is a signatory to the Hague Convention, another which is
19. European Convention, supra note 16, arts. 2-5, at 274-75; Hague Convention, supra
note 12, art. 7, at 1502.
20. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 10, at 1502.
21. Id. arts. 12 and 13, at 1502-03.
22. European Convention, supra note 16, art. II, at 227.
23. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 21, at 1503.
24. P.M. HOFF. J. SCHULMAN, A.E. VOLENIK & J.E. O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE CHILD CUS-
TODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY. PRACTICE AND LAW 10-11 (1982)
[hereinafter P.M. HOFF]; Hague Convention, supra note 12, at 1501; Berringer, supra note 8,
at 22.
25. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437
(1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 11601-10 (1989)). "The United States of America deposited its
instrument of ratification of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction . . . on April 29, 1988, The Convention entered into force for the United States on
July I, 1988." Exec. Order No. 12,648, 53 Fed. Reg. 30,637 (1988).
26. Even between signatories there are limits to the right to invoke relief. "[The] Peti-
tioner must satisfy two threshold issues: 1) lawful rights of custody at the time of the removal
or retention; and 2) that such removal or retention is from the child's 'habitual residence' ...
Custody rights are determined by the law of the child's habitual residence." Meredith v. Mere-
dith, - F. Supp. - (WESTLAW, 1991 WL 42289 (D. Ariz.), 3). Foretich is ineligible
for relief under the Hague Convention because he did not have legal custody of Hilary at the
time of her removal from her "habitual residence."
27. P.M. HOFF, supra note 24, at 10-1.
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not. 8 However, the two countries do not have totally different phi-
losophies regarding international custody matters. By its ratification
of the Hague Convention, the United States has expressed a willing-
ness to be bound by the "welfare of the child" doctrine emphasized
by that agreement. New Zealand, which does not consider itself
bound by the Convention, has already stressed its reliance on the
same doctrine. However, although the two jurisdictions can be said
to share a concern for Hilary's welfare and best interests, it must
first be decided what her best interests are.
My job is to protect the child and make sure that anything
that's done isin her interests. .. Sometimes parents overlook
the interest of their child, they are so busy pushing their own
barrow. 9
Throughout Hilary Foretich's short history, quite a few barrows
have been pushed, not all of them hers and not all of them in her
interest. It is indisputable that if Hilary was sexually abused, that
abuse must be stopped and Hilary receive treatment. It is also indis-
putable that if her father, Dr. Eric Foretich, is innocent of the accu-
sations made against him by his former wife, Dr. Elizabeth Morgan,
he should be exonerated. These two contentions are apparently only
aspects of the same issue, one which centers on Hilary's best inter-
ests. Instead, they became a breeding ground for a bundle of fre-
quently contradictory interests.
Elizabeth Morgan, suspecting that Hilary had been sexually
abused, determinedly and unrelentingly moved to protect her daugh-
ter. Before she acted on her own, Morgan sought the Court's help in
protecting Hilary from a possibly abusive situation by moving for
modification of Foretich's visitation rights. But when Morgan was
faced with what she regarded as an untenable situation, sending Hil-
ary to her father for a two-week, unsupervised visit, she finally,
flatly, refused to continue working through the legal system and sent
her daughter into hiding. 0
Morgan seemed to be acting only in Hilary's best interests.
However, there were aspects of her behavior which do not agree with
that argument. Instead of taking every step she could to protect her
child's privacy and reputation by preventing the public revelation of
private information, Morgan demanded and actively courted
disclosure.
The Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued an order
restricting public disclosure of the details of Morgan's sexual abuse
28. Berringer, supra note 8, at 22.
29. Cropp, supra note 7, at 12 (quoting Isabel Mitchell, Hilary Foretich's court-ap-
pointed lawyer in New Zealand).
30. Morgan v. Foretich, 546 A.2d 407, 408-09 (D.C. App. 1988).
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charges. Morgan moved to modify the order and unseal the record.3 '
She also objected to the public being barred from that part of her
contempt hearing in which she "recit[ed] allegations as to specific
acts of sexual abuse upon H."' While public revelation of such de-
tails might have embarrassed the father and turned opinion against
him, it would have served no legal purpose and would have exposed
Hilary to gossip and speculation which could not possibly benefit the
child or be in her best interests.
Morgan courted disclosure outside the courtroom as well. It was
probably inevitable that the press would discover the Morgan-Fore-
tich case, especially after Morgan was imprisoned on contempt
charges and stayed there, month after month. But while Morgan
could not control the press' access to her story, she could have con-
trolled the press' access to her. However, she chose "to go public"
with her daughter's story. She published an explanation of why she
went to jail; she gave interviews; she permitted photographs to be
taken.3 3 In jail because she was protecting her daughter's interests
by refusing to reveal her whereabouts, Elizabeth Morgan succeeded
in focusing the spotlight of world attention on herself and on Hilary
and her problems.
If Morgan's behavior seems suspiciously self-serving, Eric Fore-
tich's attitudes were also suspect. He denied Morgan's charges and
mounted a vigorous defense of his innocence. He took and passed lie
detector tests." ' He searched diligently and expensively for his
daughter and found her. But was he serving his own interests or
Hilary's?
Although Foretich invited Hilary's guardian ad litem to super-
vise their short visits, that supervision ceased as soon as the visits
became overnight ones.35 Did Foretich fear that accepting supervi-
sion implied he had something to hide? But he had already been
supervised, at his own instigation, and his reputation was already
dented if not permanently damaged. He could not harm himself;
why not protect himself and his daughter by providing an impartial
witness to their visits whose presence would ward off further innu-
endo and accusations?
Foretich also objected to recommendations that Hilary be evalu-
ated by neutral experts and did not withdraw that objection until
after the child had disappeared. 36 Although Hilary's guardian first
made the recommendation in 1986 and although Morgan also ar-
31. Id. at 409.
32. Id. at 412.
33. A Mother's Tale, supra note 5, at 30; Elson, supra note 4, at 66.
34. Elson, supra note 4, at 66.
35. Morgan v. Foretich, 546 A.2d 407, 409 (D.C. App, 1988).
36. Id. at 414.
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gued for the use of neutral experts as a wise and fair alternative to
adversarial proceedings, Foretich objected. 37 Why did he wait to
withdraw his objection until Hilary had been gone eight months and
was no longer available to be examined?
There was a third party to this case. While Hilary's parents
were busily pushing their own barrows and apparently forgetting
whose interests were most important, the court was in an ideal posi-
tion to remember and to protect those interests. Yet for some reason,
the court chose to put Foretich's interests ahead of his daughter's.
The court found the evidence against Foretich to be "in equi-
poise" and refused to terminate or modify his visitation rights. 38
While the evidence did not prove him to be guilty of abuse, neither
did it prove him to be innocent. Did the court feel that by ordering
supervised visitation Foretich's innocence would be placed in doubt?
Hilary's guardian sought and was denied emergency stays of
weekend visitation orders.39 The court could have ordered supervi-
sion as an alternative to a stay. Such an order was within the court's
discretion, as much so as a refusal. Why, then, did the court not act
to protect Hilary's best interests, just in case the half of the evidence
which indicated she had been abused was correct?
The court also chose not to order Hilary's evaluation by a neu-
tral team of experts. Hilary's guardian had consistently suggested
that option for nearly a year prior to the 1987 hearings. The appeals
court had favorably mentioned'such a possibility. Morgan had urged
it.40 The court, however, refrained from promoting Hilary's interests
by trying to discover, once and for all, whether she had or had not
been abused. Instead, the court chose to do nothing.
Finally, the court acted precipitately in ordering the two-week,
unsupervised visit which eventually caused Morgan to secrete her
child. While still receiving evidence during hearings to rule on a new
set of motions which included Foretich's visitation rights, the court
ordered the extended, unsupervised visit on the grounds that summer
was drawing to a close and Hilary would soon return to school.4 ' The
court reasoned, "to further delay the defendant-father's entitlement
to summer visitation with his child until [a ruling was made] results
in a denial of said summer visitation by default.142 In order to pre-
serve Foretich's right to one summer visit, the court was unwilling to
put the child's interests ahead of the father's.
Mother, father, court: all failed to promote Hilary's interests in
37. Id. at 413.
38. Id. at 410.
39. Id. at 409.
40. Id. at 413-14.




a happy, safe childhood, free from the insecurities, fears, and inva-
sive publicity she was obliged to suffer. By 1990, it was time for a
neutral and compassionate authority to consider and settle her case
in the light of what is really best for her.
[A~ll decisions relating to the welfare and future of chil-
dren have to be decided on the 'best interests' of the children
principle and no other [interpretations] are to be put on that
test.
4 a
It became New Zealand's turn to protect Hilary Foretich's best
interests. Current international law encourages recognition and en-
forcement of another state's custody and visitation orders. The
Hague Convention directs that children should be returned to the
jurisdiction which granted the original orders but allows a jurisdic-
tion to refuse to return a child where her welfare and best interests
would be affected." Although New Zealand is not a signatory of the
Hague Convention and is not bound by it, the New Zealand courts
stated that the judge in Hilary's case would be bound by his inter-
pretation of what was best for Hilary4" and not necessarily by the
interests of international comity. However, because the Hague Con-
vention is so specifically concerned with a child's best interests, it
provides a practical guide as to how, in accordance with interna-
tional law, a court should decide such a case as this.
The Convention stipulates several grounds which permit a state
to refuse to return a child. Article 12 allows a state to refuse to
return a child if more than a year has lapsed since the child was
taken and if it is shown that the child is presently settled in its new
home.I Hilary left the United States in 1987.7 She had been in
New Zealand for nearly two years before being discovered, had lived
in the same place for that time, and had attended a private school."
The court could rationally decide that these circumstances consti-
tuted being settled.
Article 13(a) of the Convention says that a state is not required
to order the return of a child if the legal custodian agreed to the
child's removal.4 Morgan's custody of Hilary has never been re-
voked, 50 and she initiated Hilary's odyssey.5 1 Article 13 also permits
a court to refuse to return a child if the child objects and if she is
43. In re C., (C.A. 1977), reprinted in 5 Fan. L. Rep. 2248, 2249.
44. Hague Convention, supra note 12, arts. 8-13, 19 I.L.M. at 1502-03.
45. Berringer, supra note 8, at 22.
46. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
47. Berringer, supra note 8, at 22.
48. Parents See Girl, supra note I1, at 16.
49. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
50. Morgan v. Foretich, 546 A.2d 407, 408-09 (D.C. App. 1988).
51. Cropp, supra note 7, at 12.
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thought to be old enough and mature enough that her views should
be considered. 52 The New Zealand court indicated its interest in Hil-
ary's feelings by ordering a professional evaluation of the effect see-
ing her father again would have on her.53 Although the court could
decide that Hilary, at eight, would not be not old enough or mature
enough for her opinions to be given the greatest possible weight, the
court would be justified in taking them into consideration.
There is, however, a most trenchant argument against obliging
New Zealand to return Hilary to the United States. The Convention
permits a state to refuse to return a child if "there is a grave risk
that his or her return would expose the child to a physical or psycho-
logical harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situa-
tion." 4 The court could decide that evidence did not indicate Hilary
would suffer harm if she were returned. However, the family situa-
tion as it existed when Hilary disappeared was certainly intolerable
for a child, and that alone would be grounds for refusing to return
Hilary.
Nothing was settled legally after Hilary left the United States.
The District of Columbia court order requiring Morgan to produce
Hilary for the two-week, unsupervised visit with her father is appar-
ently still in effect."6 A companion case in the Virginia courts might
need to be re-tried due to erroneous exclusion of evidence which indi-
cated that Hilary had been abused by her father. Morgan v. Fore-
tich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988).56 For over two years both par-
ents, and their various supporters and critics, exchanged insults and
opinions in the press and on television. 57 There are hard feelings,
accusations and questions on all sides of the case and no decisions or
agreements except that Hilary has suffered the most from the pro-
longed disagreement.58 There is nothing at all tolerable in this situa-
tion for Hilary. By itself, the unsettled and unsettling status of Hil-
ary's case in the United States would be abundant reason for New
Zealand to keep her within its jurisdiction.
Once a state decides not to return a child, it must make a deci-
sion about that child's care. New Zealand decided not to return Hil-
ary to the United States until its courts adjudicated the matter and
questions of custody and visitation were resolved. The Convention
does not specifically address the question of whether one jurisdiction
52. Hague Convention, supra note 12, 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
53. Berringer, supra note 8, at 22.
54. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 13(b), 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
55. Berringer, Girl In Custody Case Emerges in New Zealand, New York Times, Feb.
24, 1990, at 9, col. 4.
56. Morgan v. Foretich, 546 A.2d 407, 414 (D.C. App. 1988).
57. Elson, supra note 4, at 66; Parents See Girl, supra note II, at 16.
58. A Mother's Tale, supra note 5, at 30.
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should over-rule another's custody orders. It does direct that the
merits of custody should not be decided until after a jurisdiction de-
cides not to return a child."' It also notes that while a state may take
notice of foreign judicial decisions and custody orders, a state is not
required to recognize or enforce another state's decisions or orders.
This suggests, therefore, that if a state has the right to decide to
retain a child, it should also have the right to decide who will have
charge of her.
The Convention addresses the question of rights of access or vis-
itation even less specifically, directing only that a state should "pro-
mote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights. . . ." and noting that
the state may initiate or assist in proceedings which would either
specify or organize these rights. 60 Rationally, if a state has the right
to adjudicate custody rights, it should also have the right to adjudi-
cate visitation rights, modifying or terminating them in whichever
manner the court feels will best serve the child's interests.
The questions of custody and visitation rights which were being
heard when Hilary Foretich disappeared have not been settled. To
date, the United States court in.volved has not indicated it wishes to
resume hearings.61 The litigants transferred their attention to the
New Zealand courts and placed New Zealand in the fortunate posi-
tion of being able to stabilize a little girl's life and provide her with
some measure of security and happiness. Both international law and
the disposition of the New Zealand courts dictate that in matters of
custody and right of access the child's welfare and best interests
should be put before all other claims and interests. Therefore, New
Zealand should not be obligated to return Hilary to the legal and
personal turmoil which await her in the United States. It is in her
best interests for her new country to exercise its jurisdiction to de-
cide who will have custody of her, who will be allowed to visit her,
and the circumstances of both.
POSTSCRIPT
November 21, 1990, the New Zealand Family Court handed
down a decision in the Hilary Foretich case.62 Finding that "Hilary's.
'physical, educational, spiritual and emotional needs are being
met,' " the court awarded Elizabeth Morgan custody of her daugh-
ter, subject to certain limitations.63
Hilary is required to remain in New Zealand, and the court has
59. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 16, 19 I.L.M. at 1503.
60. Id.
61. Berringer, supra note 55, at 9.
62. Twomey, Morgan-Foretich Fight Ends-for Now, The Washington Post, Dec. I,
1990 (LEXIS, Nexis file, Currnt lib.).
63. Id.
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retained her passport.64 She must remain in Christchurch, where she
presently lives, and she must continue to attend her present school.65
Morgan is required to submit a report on Hilary's progress to the
court every six months66 and is barred from publicizing Hilary's
story,67 including New Zealand publication of Morgan's book on the
case.
68
Eric Foretich is presently barred from visiting Hilary although
he may eventually be permitted to sent her gifts and letters.6 9 Bi-
annually, he will receive photographs of his daughter and reports on
her health and school work.70 The court explained its decision to
deny Foretich visitation on the grounds that such visits would again
place Hilary in "'the center of parental conflict with inevitable dis-
ruption to her emotional security.' "71
The court order clearly favors Hilary's interests over those of
her parents. Keeping Hilary in New Zealand is against the interests
and the wishes of both parents. Morgan is currently married to a
United States federal judge and has indicated she wishes to return to
the U.S.72 Foretich has said he is obliged to give up his custody bat-
tle because "'I can't physically take her from New Zealand, and I'm
not going to move there.' ,,13 However, the court said that permitting
Hilary to return would subject her to media scrutiny which could be
emotionally detrimental .7
The court specifically did not decide the question of whether
Hilary was actually sexually abused.75 Instead, saying Hilary be-
lieves her father abused her, whether he actually did or not,7 6 the
court faulted Morgan and her parents for perpetuating the abuse
issue. 77 The court observed, "'it is now part of the family ethos that
[Hilary] is an abused child, and it would be impossible for her not to
identify with the convictions of her mother and maternal
grandparents.' "78
64. Id.
65. Legal Times, Dec. 10, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis file, Currnt lib.) [hereinafter Legal
Times 12/10/90].
66. Ruling on Custody Ends Bitter Case, The New York Times, Dec. I, 1990 (LEXIS,
Nexis file, Currnt lib.).
67. Legal Times 12/10/90, supra note 65.
68. Twomey, supra note 62.
69. Id. Foretich has said that the court order requires him to make arrangements for
any visitation with the New Zealand court. Castaneda, New Zealand Gives Custody to Mor-
gan, The Washington Post, Nov. 30, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis file, Currnt lib.).
70. Twomey, supra note 62.
71. Legal Times, 12/10/90, supra note 65.
72. Twomey, supra note 62.
73. Castaneda, supra note 69.
74. Twomey, supra note 62.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Legal Times 12/10/90, supra note 65.
78. Twomey, supra, note 62. Two weeks after the New Zealand Family Court denied
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The court also gave consideration to Hilary's future, in spite of
Foretich's suggestion the order did not address that issue.79 The
court noted the extreme animosity which characterized Morgan's
and Foretich's dispute and doubted if much would change, even if
Foretich were found innocent of the abuse charge. 80 The court laid
much of the burden on Morgan for the needed change. She must
"'relax her determination that Dr. Foretich should not have a mean-
ingful part to play in Hilary's life. . . .When that happens, progress
can be made.' "81
Adjudication of custody rights, visitation, and the limits at-
tached to both: the dictates of international law placed these issues
in the hands of the New Zealand Family Court with the stricture
that Hilary Foretich's welfare and best interests are of paramount
importance. Unlike her parents and previous courts, the New Zea-
land court made the best of a very bad.situation, and, by the terms
of its November order, obviously intends that situation to improve
under the court's supervision. Eventually Hilary may have a chance
to be happy.
Suzanne McGrath Dale
Foretich visitation rights with Hilary, not on grounds that she had been abused but merely
because she believed she had been abused, a Fairfax County (VA) Circuit Court judge indi-
cated that he might deny Foretich visitation with his elder daughter for similar reasons. The
judge in the custody dispute between Foretich and his second wife had previously found that
allegations Foretich had abused the older girl were not proven. The judge suggested the girl's
mother had coached her. Weil, Foretich May be Barred from Seeing Other Child, The Wash-
ington Post, Dec. 8, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis file, Currnt lib).
Foretich has been accused of abusing both his daughters. Neither charge has been proven,
and yet two courts have or are contemplating denying him visitation because both girls believe
they have been abused. It is possible Foretich did abuse the children and that there simply is
not enough evidence to prove the allegations. It is also possible that he did not. In neither case
does the truth of the matter seem to be the basis for the judge's decisions, only the belief of a
child.
What is so chilling in these two cases is the concept of "constructive abuse" that both
courts seem to be promoting: as long as the child believes, for whatever reason, it has been
abused, treat the "abusing" parent as if the charges are true, even though they may be false. If
other courts follow this new doctrine, children may become lethal weapons for parents to use
against each other and other adults. The potential for injustice in this "constructive abuse" has
frightening, historic parallels in the Salem (MA) witch trials and the McCarthy-era hunt for
Communists, and the doctrine should be used sparingly, if at all.
79. Legal Times 12/10/90, supra note 65.
80. Twomey, supra note 62.
8 1. Id.

